

[*This is a revised version of chapter 6 from On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). It is intended to widen the discussion of images and pictures by providing a discussion of three non-Western texts: one Chinese, one Persian, and one Indian.*

Thanks to Bill Gates—that is, the new version of Word—some of the diacritics and accented vowels in the transcriptions of Sanskrit terms have dropped out.

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DIFFERENT HORIZONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE

The points I have tried to make in these last two chapters could be condensed into two hypotheses: first, pictures and writing are understood to share essential traits of legibility (that word understood as something like *comprehensibility*, or *capacity for sense*) so that it can only make limited sense to interpret either using methods borrowed from the other; and second, pictures are related not only to writing, but also to notation, sculpture, and especially numbers. These arguments are intended to make it cumulatively harder to think about pictures as things distinct from other visual artifacts. Now I want to widen the terms even further, moving away from Western paths of thinking and toward other ways of conceiving the image.

In a sense the indissoluble unity of graphic and linguistic marks is already there in the Greek word *gramma*, meaning picture, written letter, or piece of writing. In Greek *graphein* means to write, draw, or scratch, and so the word enlarges the association of picture with writing by bringing in engraving and opening the field to marks of all sorts: hard chisel marks, glyptic impressions in wax, the impressions of tokens on clay containers. And if we go deeper into the history of language, then *gramma* and *graphein* come in turn from the Indo-European root *gerebh-, which is the Western world's most general lexeme for writing, drawing, scratching,

and marking of all sorts.¹ The Greek words and their putative Indo–European origin reflect a Near Eastern practice that we glimpsed in the last chapter: a confluence of pictures, writing, notation, and sculpture that served economic purposes. (It is implicit in Denise Schmandt-Besserat’s explorations of ancient Middle Eastern clay tokens that the origins of numbers, pictures, and writing cannot be disentangled.) Those connections are the bare outlines of a broader notion of the image that was once the normal state of affairs, and now has been largely forgotten.

At the same time, the prehistoric Balkan Vinča material I explored earlier (in which signs and pseudo-signs mingle, apparently in the service of ritual interests that benefitted from the *appearance* of writing) suggests it would not be correct to emphasize the economic dimensions of pictures, pseudo-writing, and proto–writing at the expense of their religious or ritual meanings. Here I want to continue searching for more inclusive notions of the image, this time by moving outside of Western art. This chapter concerns Persian, Indian, and Chinese texts on the historiography of pictures, written between the seventh and the sixteenth centuries. The non–Western texts are opportunities to think about the restrictiveness of even our most adventurous contemporary explorations: I want to show how much more is out there, and ultimately how little of the image we normally see. These are the opportunities, I would like to say, for contemporary scholarship that is genuinely in search of different horizons. If we really want to challenge ourselves, we need to give up our interest in aesthetically accomplished artworks, our attachment to the fine arts, and our self-imposed restriction to the West, whether or not it is “provincialized,” whether or not it is seen through a post-postcolonial lens, whether or not it seems like a problem that has been solved by the newly international economies.²

There are common threads in this widening view, despite the fact that I have chosen texts with minimal connections to the Western discourse on art. The most important is that in each set of texts, pictures are understood both in relation to a broad range of responses and a wide variety of kinds of visual artifacts. The two sources of expansion, I think, go hand in hand: the full complexity of the image depends on its multiple functions, and those functions, in turn, may

require that distinctions between pictures, scripts, and other systems of markmaking be suspended.

PAINTING AND MAGIC IN CHINA

In China for example, there is Zhang Yanyuan's beautiful and complicated *Record of the Famous Painters of all the Dynasties*, completed in 847 AD. It occupies a position very roughly analogous to Vitruvius in the West—which is to say it is a compendium incorporating earlier texts, which survives almost alone to testify to the plenitude of a previous tradition. In another sense, Zhang's text is like Vasari's: it stands at the beginning of a tradition of historiographically self-aware writing that identifies itself with the history of art. Zhang is a learned author, whose dry thoroughness is more than made up for by his eloquence and perfect sense of narrative forms. His English translator, William Acker, supposes that the density of the opening section of Zhang's text—a mosaic of mythological and historical references regarding the nature of painting, *hua* 畫—is due to his anxiety to find painting a place among the “six sciences,” which include writing but no visual art. To that end, Zhang consults various ancient authorities who might support his notion that painting is a kind of writing; and in the course of that search he reviews a number of origin myths for painting that have resonance here.

Recently, Zhang's text has become controversial, not in itself, but in its historiography. There have been attempts to revive it as a model for writing contemporary Chinese scholarship that might be independent of Western art history, and there have also been conversations about the merits of comparing Zhang's book with Vitruvius or Vasari. Here I'll introduce the text the way I would like to, and then summarize some of the controversy.

At the opening of the book, Zhang asserts that “painting is a thing which perfects the civilizing teachings of the Sages and helps to maintain the social relationships.”³Acker reads this as a way of giving painting “the first and highest praise, from a Confucian point of view,” by showing how it might advance the cause of a “just social order” (81). Zhang's text may have

been influenced here by the recent resurgence of Confucianism, especially in the work of Han Yü (768–824), whose ideas blend Confucian ethics with a metaphysical framework not incompatible with Zhang’s.⁴ But if early readers of Zhang’s text would have connected his first sentence with what is now called Neo–Confucianism, they would also have recognized echoes of statements on the ethical purpose of painting that go back at least to the third century.⁵ I would read the sentence, therefore, as sincere but succinct formal opening, placing the political and ethical values of the society at the forefront of the reader’s mind and also moving quickly beyond them.

The single opening sentence is enough of an allusion to evoke a large, open–ended range of Confucian meanings, and the second sentence does the same for a very different subject. Painting, Zhang continues, “penetrates completely the divine permutations of Nature and fathoms recondite and subtle things” (62). The “permutations,” in Acker’s gloss, are “the visible phenomena of nature, such as weather” and “calamities such as hurricanes and floods,” and Zhang means to say that painting is nothing less than a practice in intimate connection to the forces of nature. “I think there is no question,” Acker writes, that Zhang

is thinking of the many stories according to which paintings have been known to show evidence of being charged with an inner life of their own, a magic efficacy which sometimes merely overflowed in the form of what we would call spiritualistic phenomena, but sometimes was of practical benefit to man. The story of the T’ang Emperor remarking to Li Sze–hsün: “From a screen that you painted I heard the sound of water gurgling at night. You are a master hand, in communication with the Gods” (82).

And this “magical” power does not only make painting into a tool for the control of nature. The practice of painting is more radical than that, because it is itself a *product* of nature. As Zhang says, without equivocation: Painting “proceeds from Nature itself and not from human invention” (62). In Acker’s words, this is the ultimate source of Zhang’s doctrine regarding painting: “the art is of cosmic origin, and was *revealed* to man, not invented by him” (84).

These are remarkable opening lines for a text on painting, and it is worth reading them again in full:

Now painting is a thing which perfects the civilizing teachings of the Sages and helps to maintain the social relationships. It penetrates completely the divine permutations of Nature and fathoms recondite and subtle things. Its merit is equal to that of any of the Six Arts of Antiquity [which include writing, but not painting], and it moves side by side with the Four Seasons. It proceeds from Nature itself and not from human invention (61).

Here is a concept of the image that we have almost entirely forgotten, although it has echoes in the problems of representing whatever is invisible or divine.⁶ To Zhang Yanyuan and other Tang and Song writers on painting, a picture is so closely related to Nature that it can be indistinguishable from it. The same laws play on its surface and on the surface of clouds or mountains, and because Nature is the repository of laws and harmonies, a painting can shape those harmonies in the social sphere as well as in Nature itself. A painting can be an ethical and moral good, an agent of change in people and in Nature. There is, at the very least, a directness about this that the West has seldom had. To put it provisionally, the difference between Western theories of representation and this kind of *identification* between picture and nature is similar to the difference between mimesis as it is usually understood (as a relation involving two ontologically related but distinct elements, the artwork and the world) and mimesis as it has been developed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, and others—that is, roughly, as a psychoanalytic concept denoting perfect identification between two egos, or between the ego of an individual and a group.⁷ Yet my purpose here is not to find Western analogies but rather to consider what happens in several non-Western texts: and here, the identification of nature and artwork is paired with two concepts that have no role in classical or psychoanalytic mimesis: the maintenance of social relationships, and a magical sympathy with the weather.

From this point this text begins to proliferate its theories, genealogies, techniques, philosophies, philologies, and classifications of all sorts: but this is the starting place, the

invocation and the ultimate source of meaning. I will point out just two other moments in the opening pages. The first passage concerns a vacillation in the definition of painting between a kind of image that *resembles* the world, and one that merely *gives form*. The fact that Zhang never takes any notice of this vacillation, never presents it as such, is an essential element of his understanding of painting. It does not matter, as it might to a Westerner, whether painting imitates the world—whether it is based on resemblance, and tends finally toward or away from naturalism—or rather just *exhibits forms* in a way that writing and other markmaking cannot. In contemplating this amazing insouciance it is helpful to bear in mind that Chinese writing is also understood, in a traditional Chinese explication, as having both “styles” and pictorial categories, though they are not the same as they are sometimes portrayed in the West. In the Chinese tradition, according to Zhang, there are six styles of calligraphy (ancient pictograms, strange characters, seal script, clerical script, tangled seal script, and bird writing) and six categories by which visual elements are incorporated into writing (indicative characters, agreeing sounds, simple pictograms, ideographic compounds, extended meanings, and borrowed characters). This is not the place to explore the various interpretations that have been given to the second of these lists: it is enough to note that the pictographic property of some Chinese characters, so often noted in the West, is only one way that characters can be like pictures, and only one way they can gain meaning.⁸ When a twentieth-century scholar, Bernard Karlgren, wrote a commentary on the list, he rearranged it so that “simple pictograms” came first: a subtle but typical sign of the conventional Western emphasis.⁹ The Chinese pedagogy makes no such emphasis, except when it comes to the origin myth of writing. Zhang recounts how “the footprints of birds and of tortoises... at last determined the forms of the first written characters,” and how upon their appearance, “creation could no longer hide its secrets, and therefore showers of grain fell from the sky: supernatural beings could no longer hide their shapes, [and so] demons howled at night”—in other words, two kinds of marks determined all six classes of characters, with their varying relations to images (63). With Zhang’s vacillation in mind, it is interesting to collect some of the definitions of painting (*hua* 畫), from other Chinese texts. In one, painting is “the

representation of forms”; in another, “to paint is to cause to resemble”; in a third, “to paint is to give form”; in a fourth, a painting “sets down the appearance of things” (66–68, 70). The ambivalence is perfect, almost as if Zhang had arranged his references intentionally to alternate between naturalism and “pure form.” Writing preserves memory, and painting preserves form: but it is not at all clear whether it matters to say that painting preserves forms by resembling them or just by displaying them.

The second passage I will emphasize concerns one of Zhang’s sources, the famous drunkard Yen Yen–chih, “Director of the Imperial Banqueting Court” (65). To Yen there are not two arts, painting and calligraphy (書 *shu*), but three. The second in his list is “the representation of concepts,” which is to say the “study of written characters,” and the third is “the representation of forms,” which is painting. And the first is entirely unexpected: it is “the representation of principles,” that is “the forms of the hexagrams” and trigrams in the *I Ching*. Here Yen Yen–ching is playing with the word *tu* 圖, meaning “image” or “representation” (103), and using it to claim that painting and writing both “represent” (so that painting can be included in the fold of the Six Sciences): but from my point of view, what is exceptional here is the notion that there might be *three* modes of representing, and that the third, “the representation of principles,” might result in something that looks a little like a picture and a little like a word, but is neither—the hexagrams of the *I Ching*.

There is a long literature on the images in the *I Ching*, and the way the commentaries to the hexagrams move subtly from treating them as “non–verbal oracles” to colorfully imagined images.¹⁰ Trigrams are sometimes surrounded by interpretive schemata and images. The twentieth–century Japanese philosopher Toshihiko Izutsu calls the hexagrams the “stage of No–Image” or the “imageless world,” and says they become concrete as they are interpreted.¹¹ But Yen’s formula is even stronger, because it makes the *I Ching* into a separate category, and expands the familiar polarity of writing and picturing into a triad of concepts, forms, and principles—writing, pictures, and some third term for which we have no close equivalent. The

Indo-European *gerebh- or the Greek *graphein* are not unrelated to these possibilities, but they did not prevent the Western imagination from collapsing into the duality of writing and pictures.

At this point I want to leave Zhang's text, letting these ideas resonate against one another and against the double Western concern with mimesis and meaning. Zhang's way of thinking about painting and writing is so open to other possibilities that it can seem meaningless or featureless to Western ears, and it takes a while to become acclimatized to its empty spaces. One way forward is a recent study by Si Han of Zheng Qiao's treatise *Tu pu lue* 圖譜略; in Zheng's book, pictures and writing are augmented by a third term, tables (*pu* 譜). Si Han pays particular attention to the way that Zheng articulates his exposition by means of the concept *xiang* (象, provisionally "shape" or "form"). The challenge for future studies, I think, will be to find ways of rendering concepts such as Zheng's and Zhang's meaningful within Western discourses on the image.

I need to add, before I introduce the next text, that Zhang's *Record of the Famous Painters of all the Dynasties* has recently become somewhat controversial for the roles it plays in contemporary art historical pedagogy and methodology. My initial argument about the text, made in the first version of this essay in 1998, stressed the strangeness of Zhang's text.¹² I was struck by how unlikely it would be to read about painting's relation to the weather in any Western text on the history of painting. Craig Clunas disagreed with that formulation several times, and he has said he teaches Vasari and Zhang side by side and is struck by their similarities. I have been told the same by Jim Cahill. I can't disagree with the assessments of experts, but I still wonder whether Zhang's coupling of Confucian values, natural forces, and painting, as formulaic or heuristic as it may be, isn't fundamentally different from the various kinds of writing—including Vasari's—that have been taken, at one time or another, as art history. And I am just as stubbornly unconvinced by the notion that contemporary art historians might take a text like Zhang's as a model for a kind of contemporary non-Western art historical practice. I proposes, at one point, that if young scholars tried to emulate Zhang's manner of writing they could not get published in

professional journals, or get jobs at major universities. A few years ago, Ding Ning, a scholar in Beijing University, reported to me that my notion was met with incredulity by some scholars in Beijing. But this is a complicated question, and this is not the place to pursue it.¹³ For now I have something much more open-ended in mind: I just want to propose that Western scholars who are concerned with the image might consider how seriously they might take ideas like Zhang's.

A PERSIAN ORIGIN MYTH

Another way of thinking of the relation between writing, images, and divinity comes from a Persian text, the early seventeenth-century treatise on *Calligraphers and Painters* by Qadi Ahmad ibn Mir-Munshi.¹⁴ In Islamic tradition instead of the Word, the first thing created by the Lord is the *qalam*, the utensil that makes writing possible. Because writing is inseparable from calligraphy, there is already no sense to the division between the word itself—and ultimately, the divine Word—and the graphic form of the word. The six principal styles of Islamic calligraphy, which Qadi Ahmad reviews, have varying degrees of sanctity depending on how soon after the revelations of the Lord they came to be used. Following a tradition of Shi'ite scholarship, Qadi Ahmad ascribes the origination of writing to 'Ali ibn Abi-Talib, because he wants to legitimate the *nasta'liq* script practiced by Shi'a over the canonical *kufi*, *naskh*, *thuluth*, and other styles.¹⁵

But the relative claims of the scripts remain less important than the conception of writing itself, which made the act of calligraphy (understood principally as the copying of the *Qur'an*) into a form of worship. As Qadi Ahmad says, “purity of writing is purity of soul” (22, 122), and, allegedly quoting Plato, “Writing is the geometry of the soul, and it manifests itself by means of the organs of the body” (52). Excellent handwriting, Qadi Ahmad says, is “like a soul in the body of young and old. / For the rich man it is an adornment, / For the needy one it is an aid” (51).

One of the most wonderful examples of the holiness of calligraphy is the practice of drinking *Qur'anic* verses as medicine, a custom that is widely practiced outside the major centers of Islam and particularly in Northern Africa. Among the Berti in northern Sudan, graduates of *Qur'anic* schools who claim to have committed the *Qur'an* to memory (*fakis*) also serve as doctors, and in response to complaints they write certain verses from the *Qur'an* on wooden slates, using ink made of soot and gum arabic. The verses are repeated a certain number of times; common numbers include 3, 7, 41, 100, 313 and 1000. The ink is then washed off and the patients drink it. The water is called *mihai*, from a verb meaning “to erase,” and the entire procedure is called “erasure.” In an account of this practice, Abdullahi Osman El-Tom stresses its efficacy, which is considered better than wearing amulets with inscriptions from the *Qur'an*, but not as efficacious as memorizing the *Qur'an* as the *fakis* do.¹⁶ Through erasure the *Qur'an* is “internalized” by people who often could not read it and would not be aware of the meaning of the verses that are chosen by the *faki*. Here the *Qur'an*, its words and its holy names, its subject matter, its repetitions, its calligraphy, and its actual physical letters are all conflated in a way that is inconceivable in the Judaeo-Christian tradition but entirely characteristic of the floating correlations between embodied word, read word, and drawn word that also operate in Qadi Ahmad's text.

So far Qadi Ahmad's ideas are common to the Islamic tradition, and some to the Shi'ite sect in particular. But like Zhang Yanyuan, Qadi Ahmad is partly concerned to rehabilitate painting, and in this case the problem is to give it the sanctity that calligraphy had always possessed. His solution is a novel translation of the word usually given as “pen” or “writing reed,” *qalam*. The word occurs in the *Qur'an* where the Prophet is instructed to listen to the Lord, “who taught the use of the writing reed [*qalam*].”¹⁷ There is also an entire *surah* (chapter) titled *al-Qalam*.¹⁸ *Calligraphers and Painters* opens (after a long set of eulogies) with a reminder about the importance of verse revealing that the Lord had “taught the use of the *qalam*”:

Let it not be concealed from the world–adorning gaze that the first object created by the Creator, let Him be praised and exalted, was the *qalam* of marvelous writing, whence the divine words: “read (O Prophet!): by the most benevolent Lord, who taught the use of the writing reed”!, and the tradition of the Prophet—God’s blessing on him and his family!—to the same effect: “The first thing the Lord created was the *qalam*.”

Through the *qalam* existence receives God’s orders,
From Him the candle of the *qalam* receives its light.

The *qalam* is an intermediary, as the image in the couplet suggests, and “inspiration proceeds through it”—so that it becomes the authority of human law: “the charge of commanding and prohibiting is performed by it.” At first, Qadi Ahmad praises the *qalam* as if it were an ordinary reed pen, which divides itself in order to write (to let the ink flow between the two sides):

You are a curious beauty, O reed clad in a red garment,
Double–tongued in converse, yet silent.

The calligraphic line is like the darkness of night, and the pen is like a cypress casting a shadow behind it:

Showing off your cypress stature, throwing a shadow,
Trailing under your feet a tress the color of the night.

And then, in a beautiful metaphor, he compares the *qalam* to the leaves and branches of a cypress, and writing to the shadow beneath:

The *qalam* is a cypress in the garden of knowledge,
The shadow of its order is spread over the dust (48–49).

This is a remarkable image, equating the curving lines of Islamic calligraphy to the mottled shade beneath a tree, and letting the sun be the Lord illuminating his divine instrument, the *qalam*, the way sunlight plays through the leaves of a tree. It is perhaps not irrelevant that the Persian word *khatt* means both “writing” and “down,” so that it also evokes feathered patterns and colors (51 n. 116).

All of this praise is prefatory to the central claim, which is that the *qalam* is not just an instrument of writing:

The *qalam* is an artist and a painter.

God created two kinds of *qalam*:

The one, ravishing the soul, is from a plant

And has become a sugarcane for the scribe;

And the other kind of *qalam* is from the animal,

And it has acquired its scattering of pearls from the fountain of life.

O painter of pictures which would have enticed Mani!

Thanks to you the days of talent have been adorned (50).

In this way the *qalam* can be cited to support the claims of painting as well as calligraphy. Four chapters later, when he has completed his description of the schools and masters of calligraphy, he turns to painting, and cites the works of Mani (the founder of Manicheanism, considered in Persian literature as an ideal artist) along with “Chinese and Frankish magicians” (that is, artists) as examples of great painting before the Prophet (174). The inclusion of painting with calligraphy is enough to embrace all the arts, because calligraphers were involved in architecture and ceramics, so that Qadi Ahmad’s reading allows the full range of visual arts to participate in the holiness of the first created object. Like the mixed patterns on the sand under a cypress, the *qalam* could produce signs of writing as well as shifting pictures and meaningless shapes.

The bulk of *Calligraphers and Painters* is occupied by description and praise of individual styles and artists, and the *qalam* runs through the pages as a half-hidden principle of holiness, always described as an everyday pen (“When the *qalam* reached this place its tip broke off”), but occasionally with a sense of its holy nature (“The sound of the cutting of the *qalam* is not good, / For it is the cry of its pain”) (108, 115). The ambiguities persist, for example, in the contemporary tradition of Kalamkari fabric painting, practiced in southern India. “Kalamkari” comes from *kalam*, “pen,” and so the artists practicing that tradition are “writing” the the pictures

they paint. One of the most popular subjects is the Islamic prayer mat designed as a *mihrab*: a divine image, which looks like a picture but is written.¹⁹

At first it is not easy, I think, to read *Calligraphers and Painters* without hoping also to recuperate some clear distinction between what is holy and what is mundane, or between the form and the sense of a word, or between words and images. But texts like this one have a great deal to teach us not only about the possibilities of graphic marking, but about our own persistent attempts to limit and control it. I am not aware of any recent scholarship of Qadi Ahmad's text, and in that respect it is unlike Zhang's or the Indian text I will consider next. But *Calligraphers and Painters* proposes a kind of intermediary position for painting, between the illuminating Word and the written word, that has interesting resonance with wider Islamic conceptualizations, as well as with the complicated negotiations of such ideas in the Byzantine tradition.²⁰ But, as in the case of Zhang, I want to leave those to one side for the moment and continue this open-ended search for other horizons.

PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Indian sources offer a number of different opportunities to rethink the concept of pictures, but I think none is more startling or provocative than the coincidence between the words for painting and consciousness in Pali, where painting or depicting (*citta*) is pronounced and spelled the same as mind or consciousness (*citta*). In 1931, Ananda Coomaraswamy pointed out a passage in the text known as the *Atthasālini* where the question is posed: "How does the mind produce its diverse effects?"²¹ The double meaning of consciousness/painting lets the expositor answer the question by listing the ways that painting depicts the world, and implying that the mind depicts in the same way. The passage is an early source for technical words about painting, and that is its principal interest for Coomaraswamy. It begins, in his translation:

(In reply to the question "How does the mind produce its diverse effects?"): "By the process of depicting [*cittakarana*]. There is no kind of decorative art

[*cittakamma*] in the world more various–and–pictorial [*cittatara*] than painting [*citta*]. And therein is there anything so multifarious [*aticitta*] as the kind of painting called *carana* [apparently, a kind of elaborate narrative religious painting]? A mental concept [*cittasaññ*] arises in the (mind of the) painters [*cittakrnam*] of a work, that ‘Such and such forms should be made in such and such ways.’ In accordance with this mental concept [*cittasaññ*], by drawing, priming, colouring, adding highlights, and shading, etc., duly performed, the finished painting [*cittakiriy*] arises; thus in the kind of painting known as *carana* there results a certain many-colored form; then thinking [*cintetv*] ‘Above this form, let this be; underneath, this; on both sides, this,’ thus it is that according to the operation of the mind [*cintitena kamena*] the remaining painted forms [*cittarpani*] (likewise) come to be.”²²

In this context the words for highlight, priming, and shading are not as important as the motion of the expositor’s mind as he plays with the homonym between painting and consciousness. He thinks of thinking as a kind of depicting: “because of its capacity to produce various effects in action, the mind [*citta*] is itself a depicting [*citta*]—indeed, it is even more various–and–pictorial [*cittatara*] than painting [*citta*].” Just as the painter conceives an idea, and then translates it into paint according to all the formal strategies of painting, so a person who thinks begins with a thought and then pictures it—elaborates it in a “various–and–pictorial” manner. According to the expositor, painting finally falls short of thinking because mental depiction is perfectly realized and “faultless,” while paintings—he implies—are always faulty.

Coomaraswamy only quotes one further line, because the text then turns away from the analogy with painting and resumes its interrogation of consciousness, mind, thinking, and depicting. But the full meaning of *citta* only becomes evident in the larger context, where it becomes apparent that even beyond the confines of the somewhat artificial parallel with actual painting (*carana*), what matters is *diversity*, both in pictures and in thought. *Atthasālini* (translated as “The Expositor”) is the traditional name for a commentary by Buddhaghosa on the

Dhammasangani, the first book of the *Abhidhamma Pitaka*, a central text of Theravada Buddhism.²³ Before the passage that Coomaraswamy excerpts, the expositor defines consciousness (*citta*) as “that which *thinks* of its object, is aware variously”—and the adverb, “variously,” is essential to the sense because consciousness is something that is known because it occurs in various forms: consciousness with lust, consciousness with hate, with a visual object, an auditory object, and so forth. Another near-homonym comes into play here, because the word for “variegated,” *citra*, helps explain the multiple nature of consciousness. There are four general classes of consciousness, “worldly, moral, immoral and the great inoperative,” and the expositor says all four are called consciousness “because they are variegated [*citra*] according to circumstance,” so that “the meaning of consciousness may also be understood from its capacity of producing a variety or diversity of effects” (84–85). The illustration of this variety or variegated nature is the passage Coomaraswamy quotes.

In the contemporaneous cultural context, this passage could be read alongside the question of the “gaze” of artworks, understood as *darshan* (roughly, point of view). Sculptures in particular were taken to have a special grip on the viewer, and often incited meditations on consciousness.²⁴ To understand the coincidence of painting and consciousness in this passage, it is necessary to see not only how *carana* painting is put together (since painting is only a fleeting example), but the way that consciousness is articulated. The structure of painting is an analogue to the structures of consciousness—mind also has its “priming,” “highlights,” drawing, shading, and “many-colored forms”—but the structure of consciousness is also an analogue to the structures of painting, so that it would be possible to think of what happens in painting as an instance or a translation of the kinds of consciousness. Painting would become, in effect, a demonstration of consciousness.

The *Atthasālini* is also a text on meditation, and later Buddhaghosa draws another parallel between *citta* (in the sense of mind) and *kya*, which can mean the body, the tactile sense, or bodily actions (171 n. 7). There are six ways in which physical disciplines work in tandem with varieties of consciousness: in the pursuit of tranquillity or calming, lightness or “buoyancy of

mental factors,” plasticity, wieldiness, fitness or freedom, and rectitude. Since the text is formulaic, the quality of plasticity can stand for all six. Buddhaghosa writes:

“*Kya*–plasticity” is plasticity of mental factors; *citta*–plasticity is plasticity of consciousness. They have the characteristic of suppressing the rigidity of mental factors and of consciousness; the function of crushing the same in both; the manifestation or effect of setting up no resistance; and have mental factors and consciousness as proximate cause. They are the opponents of corruptions, such as opinionativeness and conceit, which cause mental rigidity (172).

Like tranquillity, buoyancy, and the other qualities, plasticity is easy to imagine as a property of paintings, and the *Atthasālini* suggests that when such qualities appear they are signs of the variety of consciousness at work.

Even in this short catechism of six types of consciousness there is the potential for a fully articulated theory of painting that would see pictures as instances of the kinds of variety that are specific to both consciousness and physically–oriented meditation. It would be wonderful if English had the same word for painting and consciousness, and nearly the same word (*citra*) for variety; but even without those coincidences, the Pali text opens the way to a more articulated and direct exposition of the relation of mind and painting.

There are several early Indian texts on painting, and it would be possible to go in very different directions from here.²⁵ I will mention only two more. First in importance to the historiography of Indian painting is the third book of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, a sixth– or seventh–century text on the arts.²⁶ Like the Greek etymology of *graphein*, the Chinese text on the origins of painting, and the Persian history of painting and calligraphy, the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* offers a theory of the interdependence of the arts. It takes the form of a dialogue between a student, Vajra, and a master, Mārkaṇḍeya: the former asks how to make “the forms of the gods”—that is, sculptures—so that the image will conform to the rules of art and therefore manifest the deity. Mārkaṇḍeya replies that it is first necessary to know about painting (*Citrasūtram*) in order to understand “image–making.” Vakra asks about painting, and is referred

to “the canon of the dance,” which informs painting. As Vajra keeps asking, he keeps being referred to more fundamental arts, so that “image-making” depends on painting, which comes from dancing, which relies on instrumental music, which derives from vocal music, which springs from language itself. Mārkaṇḍeya refers Vajra to two languages, Sanskrit and Prakrit, and a third, *apabhṛasta* (dialects), which is “infinite” (3). Even here, the chain of dependent arts is not complete, since languages have to be known through their grammar, and the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* begins with disquisitions on language.²⁷ This way of reasoning occurs in Tantric Buddhism, where individual letters are taken as objects of meditation, and as coeval with the universe itself. The *yantras*, Tantric images for meditation, might contain only a single letter, or a word or two set in the “crevices” (*dalas*) of symbolic and representational geometric forms, so that there is no way to separate the word or letter from the picture it comprises and illuminates.²⁸

But the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* is more elaborate than the Tantric emphasis on individual letters, names of God, and *mantras* (sayings). The proliferation of terms and ideas in the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* is equivalent in bulk to texts on rhetoric by Quintilian or Cicero, and the text includes terms for most of the Western rhetorical figures, and many more that have no equivalents: when “meaning is concealed by means of synonymous words,” when “meaning is concealed by means of obsolete synonyms,” when “meaning is constructed out of the hidden meaning,” when “meaning is hidden on account of the construction of harsh syllables,” and most intriguing, when “meaning becomes difficult to understand on account of the concordance of the meaning” (19–21).

As the text progresses, the author eventually comes around to standard questions of iconography, physiognomics, symbolic gestures, proportions and technique. The opening chapters are forgotten in a profusion of workshop advice—“The ground surface for painting would have well polished space, should be free from gnats and fleas,” and so forth (137). In the *Citrasūtra*, the section on painting, several of the same technical terms recur as in the *Atthasālini* (127). It would be reading against the grain to try to find rhetorical figures in the lists of

iconographic requirements, or laws of dialectic argument in the recipes for painting. But if we take the author seriously, that is exactly what should be done, and that possibility—rather than the somewhat disjoint assemblage of recipes that comprises much of the *Citrasūtra* section of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*—could be the basis of another way of imagining the relation between painting and other activities. Rhetorical figures are a stock-in-trade of our concept of pictorial structure, but dialectic is not, and the iconography of dance is entirely foreign. Since these are all at the basis of the arts, including picturing, the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* becomes a far richer source for rhetorical parallels than Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* was to the Renaissance and to Baroque classicists.

(The *Citrasūtra* section of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* has been edited in a new edition, by Parul Mukherji. In a separate article, Mukherji takes me to task for my reading, which she takes to be an attempt to find new sources to strengthen traditional European art history.²⁹ My purpose here is more or less the opposite: I am concerned to find conceptual frames that are strong enough, entrancing enough, to engage scholars whose work continues to depend on Western intellectual genealogies.)

A final example comes from a commentary to a verse of the Upanishads, written in the twelfth century by Ramanuja. The verse in question is the beginning of the Vedānta-sūtras, Adhyāya 1, pada (line) 1, which can be translated “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman.” Since the Upanishads take the concept of Brahman as the central objective of all meditation, and of directed thought in general, this single line has occasioned hundreds of pages of commentary. In Sanskrit it is only two words, *AthatBrahmajijñs*, so that Brahman and inquiry are fused into a single concept. Ramanuja’s commentaries are set as dialogues, where a hapless interlocutor—who represents, in general, the rival interpretive school associated with the name of Sankara—is continually bested by Ramanuja.³⁰ The analogy with painting comes up about seventy pages into the commentary, as Ramanuja is setting out to prove that when scripture conflicts with perception, it must yield, since “the true cannot be known through the untrue.”³¹

As an example of something real known by means of something unreal, the interlocutor cites “the instance of the stroke and the letter.” Taking “stroke” to mean character, written word, or script, and “letter” to denote meaning or idea—Ramanuja does not specify any further—the claim would be that since only Brahman is real, the stroke is only an empty shell that serves only to contain the letter. (The field of problems here is very different from semiotics, even though it may seem that we have signifier, sign, and signified, because the three would have to be assigned different ontological levels, with the signifier lowest of all.) Ramanuja replies that the stroke is also real, and his opponent says that the stroke can only create the idea of the meaning if it is “apprehended as being [merely] a letter,” and this “being a letter” is itself untrue—that is, the physical letter exists, but the way it has to be experienced in order to think only of meaning is itself less than real. “Not so,” replies Ramanuja: “If this ‘being a letter’ were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter; for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and indefinable constitute a means” (76). As usual, the opponent—who is given no independent life in these dialogues, since his objections are nearly all anticipated—is ready, and he suggests that the “idea of the letter” should constitute the means of apprehension. Ramanuja thinks this only implies that

the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke only in so far as it is *not* the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as *not* being *any* letter.

To this hasty assertion, the opponent is ready with a different account of naming:

—But, in the same way as the word “Devadatta” conventionally denotes some particular man, so some stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolize some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter!

—Quite so, we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke and conventional power of symbolization are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real (77).

These exchanges have many points of similarity with the traditions of Western criticism, philosophy, and aesthetics, and in particular with theories of resemblance, denotation, naming and necessity, and convention. But there is, apart from all the tempting parallels, an essential difference: what is at stake here is not how meaning works, but what is “real” or “true,” and the terms that circulate in Western discourse are all oriented toward that one end. The text belongs in the wider cultural context of what Westerners call the “metaphysics” of *sankhya*, and especially its tendency toward “idealism” (in quotation marks as a Western philosopheme).³² The idea that words refer only to universals, that they are eternal and uncreated, goes to show their affinity with Brahman (whose uncreation and universality is of another level).³³ Since the purpose of thought is to approach Brahman, the doctrine of symbols (*pratikâni*) plays an important part in the Vedanta. The word *pratikam* comes from *pratiñc*, meaning “turned towards,” so that a symbol is the part of Brahman “turned towards” us, and the word for images of the gods, *pratimâ*, comes from the same root.³⁴ In this way of conceiving the activity of the sign, every mark, “stroke,” and image is variably real or unreal, true or false, empty or full, in relation to its orientation toward or away from Brahman.

PAINTING AND KISSING

In making these rapid tours I do not want to promote some specific set of concepts for the image: in a way, I want to promote them all, and show just how wide the door can be flung. It is necessary, in the end, to think of painting together with activities like calligraphy, dancing, or

drinking, in order to also see how painting has affinities not only to writing but to thinking, praying, or working magic.

In the spirit of this inquiry—which is open-ended, and could go anywhere except back into the fold of the word / image dichotomy—I want to close with one more example, this time a Western parallel between painting, friendship, and kissing. This is Wolfgang Wackernagel, meditating on the etymology of the German *Bild*, picture:

some lexicographers have for a long time insisted on a real philological relationship between the Greek *philos*, that is to say “friend” (French: *ami*) and the Indo-European root **bhilo* (correct proportion, appropriate, good, amicable/friendly), from which the German word for “image” (that is, *Bild*, and the verb *bilden*) derives (this is also where the English verb “to build,” in the sense of to form or assemble, derives). Although this hypothesis was later challenged, notably by Benveniste, the idea of *Bild* remains no less compatible with the triple meaning of *philos* that Benveniste himself defended: “mark of possession,” “friend,” and, by verbal derivation, “kiss.” Indeed, independent of any proof of direct kinship, and beyond any “amicable” relation, might the image not be perceived as something that “belongs” to the model, perhaps even its “kiss,” that is, its “imprint”?³⁵

The idea that paintings might denote friendship gets partial confirmation from an odd source, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton’s study *The Meaning of Things*, a sociological survey of peoples’ feelings about their possessions.³⁶ The authors find that what matters about “sofa paintings” is not their style, their subject, or even their value, but their function in starting conversations: their role as matchmakers, or as signs of offered friendship.

These thoughts on kissing and “imprints” then lead Wackernagel to far-reaching speculations:

It would indeed be difficult to underestimate the wealth of insights that might result from the association of the idea of the image with those of love, belonging

and friendship. Thus, for example, the very definition of the word “philosophy” would acquire an even more profound and unexpected significance were it to be defined not only as “the love of wisdom” but also “the image of wisdom.”

From these tenuous etymologies, which are at once too provocative and too diffuse, he moves into a discussion of Meister Eckhart that I will pick up again in the final chapter. For now, I would rather bring this discussion to a close with a thought about the variety that we have encountered even in this brief survey: pictures, I would say, are many more things than are dreamt of in the philosophies of visual theory and art history. In the end, they might even be kisses.

Notes

¹ “Indo-European Roots,” v. *gerebh-*, in *The American Heritage Dictionary* (New York, 1979), 1516.

² These are gestures in the direction of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*, Gayatri Spivak’s *Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, and other texts that try to reframe questions of globalization in a manner that can sometimes only be a cosmetic addition to a fundamentally Western academic understanding. I have critiques such approaches in *Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2003), and in *Art and Globalization*, edited by James Elkins, Zhivka Valiavicharska, and Alice Kim, vol. 1 of the Stone Summer Theory Institute, forthcoming, with discussions with Fredric Jameson, Susan Buck-Morss, and others.

³ Zhang Yen-yüan, *Ming hua chi [A Record of the Famous Painters of All the Dynasties]*, translated by William Acker in *Some T’ang and pre-T’ang Texts on Chinese Painting* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), 59–382. The quotation is from p. 61; I have given the quotation without interpolated brackets that Acker added. Further references will be given in the text.

⁴ See Charles Hartman, *Han Yü and the T’ang Search for Unity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

⁵ For example texts by Wang Yen-shou and Ho Yen, collected in *Early Chinese Texts on Painting*, edited by Susan Bush and Hsio-yen Shih (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 25–27.

⁶ This theme is taken up in the final chapter of the book *On Pictures, and the Words that Fail Them*, and also in two more recent publications: *On the Strange Place of Religion in Contemporary Art* (New York: Routledge, 2005), and *Re-Enchantment*, co-edited with David Morgan, vol. 6 of *The Art Seminar* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁷ Borch-Jacobsen, *The Freudian Subject*, translated by Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

⁸ A brief introduction is given in my *How to Use Your Eyes* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 64–66, especially 66 n. 3, citing Karlgren, “On the Script of the Chou Dynasty,” *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities*, Stockholm 8 (1936), especially p. 60.

¹⁰ For the literature see Hellmut Wilhelm, *The Book of Zhanes in the Western Tradition, A Selective Bibliography*, Parerga, no. 2, Institute for Comparative and Foreign Area Studies, University of Washington (Seattle: University of Washington, 1975).

¹¹ Toshihiko Izutsu, “Between Image and No-Image,” in *On Images, Far Eastern Ways of Thinking* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1988), 5.

¹² In “Different Horizons for the Concept of the Image,” *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 43 no. 1 (1998): 29–46, which was published the same year as *On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹³ It is discussed in three places: my “Afterword” to *Discovering Chinese Painting: Dialogues With Art Historians*, edited by Jason Kuo, second edition (Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 2006), 249–56; in letters to James Cahill, published in *In Stones From Other Mountains*, edited by Jason Kuo, forthcoming; and in my *Chinese Landscape Painting as Western Art History*, with an introduction by Jennifer Purtle (Hong Kong: Kong Kong University Press, forthcoming).

¹⁴ For other Persian texts, see Dust Muhammad, *Dust–Muhammad’s Account of Past and Present Painters* (1544 AD.), edited by M. Abdullah Chughatai (Lahore, 1936), abstracted in Laurence Binyon, J. V. S. Wilkinson, and B. Gray, *Persian Miniature Painting, Including a Critical and Descriptive Catalogue of the Miniatures Exhibited at Burlington House, January–March 1931* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 183–87 (reprinted New York: Dover, 1971); ‘Abd Allah ibn Ja‘far ibn Muhammad ibn Durustuya, *Treatise on Calligraphy*, edited by L. Shakho (Beyrouth, 1921); and see G. Weil, “Mahomet savait–il lire et écrire?” *Travaux du IV^e Congrès International des Orientalistes à Florence, 1878–80*.

¹⁵ B. N. Zakhoder, in *Calligraphers and Painters, A Treatise by Qadi Ahmad, Son of Mir–Munshi (circa A.H. 1015/AD 1606)*, translated by V. Minorsky, introduction by B. N. Zakhoder (Washington: Freer Gallery of Art, 1959), 21–22. Further references will be in the text.

¹⁶ Abdullahi Osman El–Tom, “Drinking the Koran: The Meaning of Koranic Verses in Berti Erasure,” in *Popular Islam, South of the Sahara*, edited by T. D. Y. Peel and C. C. Smart (Manchester, 1985), 414–31, especially 416.

¹⁷ *Qur‘an* XCVI, 3–4. Translation from Qadi Ahmad, *op. cit.*, 49.

¹⁸ Anthony Welch, *Calligraphy in the Arts of the Muslim World* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 198. Welch notes that the shape has also been interpreted as an arrow, which would be in accord with the verse, since it pertains to the calumnies of disbelievers.

¹⁹ I thank Kirtana Thangavelu for this information. For examples see Akurathi Venkateswara Rao, *The Kalamkari Industry of Masulipatam* (Hyderabad: Shuttle-Craft Publications, 1992), and Nelly Sethna, *Kalamkari: Painted and Printed Fabrics from Andhra Pradesh* (New York: Mapin, 1985).

²⁰ For the Islamic tradition see Hans Beltings’s new book []; and for the Byzantine tradition see Marie-José Mondzain, [].

²¹ Coomaraswamy, “An Early Passage on Indian Painting,” *Eastern Art* 3 (1931): 218–219. I thank Michael Rabe for bringing this essay to my attention.

²² Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, 218. I have omitted Pali words that are unrelated to the forms of *citta*, and I have modernized the spelling.

²³ See *The Expositor (Atthasālini)*, translated by Pe Maung Tin. Pali Text Society, no. 8 (London: Oxford University Press, 1920). The title, *Atthasālini*, means “Abounding in Meaning”; for the rendering “The Expositor,” see *ibid.*, viii. Further references will be in the text. See also Buddhaghosa, *The Atthasālini: Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Dhammasangani*, edited by Edward Muller (London: Pali Text Society, 1979).

²⁴ Diana Eck, *Darshan* (Philadelphia, PA: Anima, 1985).

²⁵ See for example Asok K. Bhattacharya, *Citralakṣaṇa, A Treatise on Indian Painting* (Calcutta: Saraswat Library, 1974), a translation of a sixteenth-century text; the editor lists a half-dozen further treatises (pp. 7–12). See also *Studies on the Ancient Treatise of Indian Art*, edited by Asoke Chatterjee (Calcutta: Sanskrit Book Depot, 1983), and *An Early Document of Indian Art: The Citralakṣaṇa of Nagnajit*, translated by B. N. Goswamy and A. L. Dahmen–Dallapiccola (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1976).

²⁶ *The Citrasūtra of Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, edited and translated by Parul Dave Mukherji, Kalāmūlaśāstra Series (K.M.S.) vol. 32 (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi Centre for the Arts, 2001). An older edition, criticized in Mukherji’s edition, is *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa, Third Khanda*, vol. 2, *Introduction, Appendices, Indexes*, edited by Priyabala Shah, in Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, edited by B. J. Sandesara, no. 137 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961). Further references will be in the text. The original text of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, edited by “Dr. (Miss) Priyabala Shah,” is vol. 130 of the same series (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1958). I am indebted to Michael Rabe’s essay, “The Interaction of Dance and Sculpture in South India,” *Bharata Natyam in Cultural Perspective*, edited by George Kliger (Dehli: American Institute of Indian Studies, 1993), 110–43.

²⁷ Adhyāya (chapter) 2 sets out Sanskrit grammar; Adhyāya 3 concerns metrics; 4 has to do with different kinds of sentences, including the kinds of sentences that would be said by different classes of people and gods; 5 and 6 treat dialectics, including the definitions of stras, the principles of interpretation, and the types of argument; 7 discusses Prakrit grammar; 8 through 13 concern lexicography, especially words for gods and other nouns that would be useful in the arts; and 14 through 17 have to do with rhetoric, prosody, and genres.

²⁸ Dharendra Bose, *Tantras, Their Philosophy and Occult Secrets* (Dehli: Eastern Book Linkers, 1992), 107. Since English–language sources on yantras are difficult to find, I list some sources here: Madhu Khanna, *Yantra, The Trantric Symbol of Cosmic Unity* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979); *Fifty Tantric Mystical Diagrams* (Los Angeles: L. A. County Museum of Art, 1969); Dvivedi, *Practical and Rare Work upon Yantra–Mantra–Tantra and Occult Sciences* [in Hindi and Sanskrit; title in English] (Jodaphura, Raja Ramesa Publakesana: Prapti Sthana Ajnatadarsana Karyalaya, 1983); P. H. Pott, *Yoga and Yantra: Their Interrelation and their Significance for Indian Archaeology* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1966); Swami Pranavananda, *A Treatise on Sricakra* (Yenugula Mahal: Sri Swami Pranavananda Trust, c. 1992); Ramachandra Rao, *The Yantras: Text with 32 Plates* (Dehli: Sri Satguru, 1988); and Ramachandra Rao, *Yantras and Mandalas in Temple Worship* (Bangalore: Kalpatharu Research Academy, 1988).

²⁹ This essay will appear as part of a volume edited by Thomas DaCosta Kaufman; the paper was originally given at the 2008 CIHA conference in Melbourne. Mukherji refers in her paper to an abbreviated version of this account in my *Stories of Art* (New York: Routledge, 2002); she was apparently unaware of the earlier text that is revised here. The account in *On Pictures and the Words that Fail Them*, which is revised here, was written before her own critical edition appeared, and when I used that account in *Stories of Art*, I failed to look for a new critical edition. Unfortunately, that prompted her to make a number of correctable claims, and we weren't in correspondence until it was too late to revise her account. My interest in this text, as I hope is clear, is not to shore up a Western understanding of art history: it is rather to help erode that sense. Ironically—unfortunately—Mukherji and I have compatible aims, even though her essay doesn't make it sound that way.

Mukherji's edition of the *Citrasūtra* has been reviewed by Doris Meth Srinivasan, "The *Citrasūtra* of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*," *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* (July 1, 2004), accessed online January 2008; Srinivasan criticizes Mukherji for advancing certain readings of passages in the text in the name of a "post-colonial" understanding that would free the *Citrasūtra* of colonial assumptions. Mukherji argues that several critical passages were misread by Commaraswamy and other editors. Srinivasan finds Mukherji's readings at times less convincing than the earlier, putatively colonialist interpretations.

Mukherji's own work can be seen, for example, in the large anthology [].

³⁰ For an introduction to their positions, see *The Vedānta-sūtras, with the Commentary of Sankaracarya*, translated by George Thibault, part 1. *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller, vol. 34 (New Dehli: Motilal, 1962), xxiv–xxvii.

³¹ *The Vedanta–sutras, with the Commentary of Ramanuja*, part 3, translated by George Thibault. *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller, vol. 48 (New Dehli: Motilal, 1962), 73. The book is a reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1904). Further references will be in the text.

³² See Karl Potter, *Presuppositions of Indian Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,).

³³ K. Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vednta* (Waltair: Andhra University, 1959), 17–19.

³⁴ Paul Duessen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, translated from the German by Rev. A. S. Geden (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1906), 99–101.

³⁵ Wackernagel, “Establishing the Being of Images: Master Eckhart and the Concept of Disimagination,” *Diogenes* 162 (1993): 77.

³⁶ *The Meaning of Things, Domestic Symbols and the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).